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Small businesses play a role in the technological advancement and economic growth of 
the United States.' Several studies commissioned by U.S. federal agencies have 
concluded that individuals and small entities constitute a significant source of innovative 
products and services.' Studies have also indicated that entrepreneurs and small, 
innovative firms rely more heavily upon the patent system than larger enterprises. Larger 
companies are said to possess alternative means for achieving a proprietary or property-
like interest in a particular technology. For example, trade secrecy, ready access to 
markets, trademark rights, speed of development, and consumer goodwill may to some 
degree act as substitutes to the patent system.' However, individual inventors and small 
firms often do not have these mechanisms at their disposal. As a result, the patent system 
may enjoy heightened importance with respect to these enterprises! 
 
The U.S. patent system has long acknowledged the role, and particular needs, of 
independent inventors, small firms, and universities. For example, the patent statute calls 
for each of these entities to receive a 50% discount on many USPTO fees' As the USPTO 
is currently entirely funded by the fees it charges its users,' this provision effectively calls 
for larger institutions to subsidize the patent expenditures of their smaller competitors. 
 
Beyond potentially diminished financial resources vis-a-vis larger concerns, however, 
observers have disagreed over whether small business has particular needs with respect to 
the patent system, and if so whether those needs should be reflected in patent law 
doctrines. With respect to the proposed system of "prior user rights,"' for example, some 
observers state that such rights would particularly benefit small entities, which may often 
lack a sophisticated knowledge of the patent system.' Others disagree, stating that smaller 
concerns rely heavily on the exclusivity of the patent right, and that the adoption of prior 
user rights would advantage large enterprises.' Similar debates have occurred with respect 
to other patent reform proposals, perhaps reflecting the fact that the community of small 
businesses is itself a diverse one. 
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This statement briefly reviews patent reform topics that appear to be of particular interest 
to small businesses, including adoption of a first-inventor-to-file priority principle, 
recognition of prior user rights, expansion of post-grant administration revocation 
proceedings, and renewed emphasis upon measuring the inventor's contribution when 
measuring damages for patent infringement. 
 
First Inventor to File 
 
Currently under discussion is a shift in the U.S. patent priority rule from the current 
"first-toinvent" principle to the "first- inventor-to-file" principle." Within the patent law, 
the priority rule addresses the circumstance where two or more persons independently 
develop the identical or similar invention at approximately the same time. In such cases 
the patent law must establish a rule as to which of these inventors obtains entitlement to a 
patent." 
 
In the United States, when more than one patent application is filed claiming the same 
invention, the patent will be awarded to the applicant who was the first inventor in fact. 
This conclusion holds even if the first inventor was not the first person to file apatent 
application directed towards that invention." Under this "first-to-invent" system, 13 the 
timing of real-world events, such as the date a chemist conceived of a new compound or 
a machinist constructed a new engine, is of significance. 
 
In every patent-issuing nation except the United States, priority of invention is 
established by the earliest effective filing date of a patent application disclosing the 
claiming invention." Stated differently, the inventor who first filed an application at the 
patent office is presumptively entitled to the patent. Whether or not the first applicant was 
actually the first individual to complete the invention in the field is irrelevant. This 
priority system follows the "first-inventor-to file" principle. 
 
A simple example illustrates the distinction between these priority rules. Suppose that 
inventor A synthesizes a new chemical compound on August 1, 2007, and files a patent 
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application on November 1, 2007 claiming that compound. Suppose further that inventor 
B independently invents the same compound on September l, 2007, and files a patent 
application on October 1, 2007. Inventor A would be awarded the patent under the first- 
to-invent rule, while Inventor B would obtain the patent under the first-inventor-to-file 
principle. 
 
Under the current U.S. first-to-invent rule, the majority of priority disputes in the United 
States are resolved via "interference" proceedings conducted at the USPTO.'S An 
interference is a complex administrative proceeding that ordinarily results in the award of 
priority to one of its participants. These proceedings are not especially common. One 
estimate is that less than onequarter of one percent of patents are subject to an 
interference." This statistic may mislead, however, because the expense of interference 
cases may lead to their use only for the most commercially significant inventions. 
 
The patent community has witnessed an extensive and sometimes emotional debate on 
the relative merits of the first-to-invent and first-inventor-to-file principle. Supporters of 
the current first-to-invent principle in part assert that the first-inventor- to-file system 
would create inequities by sponsoring a "race to the Patent Office." They are also 
concerned that the first-to- file system would encourage premature and sketchy 
technological disclosures in hastily-filed patent applications." 
 
Supporters of the first-inventor-to-file principle in part assert that it provides a definite, 
readily determined and fixed date of priority of invention, which would lead to greater 
legal certainty within innovative industries. They also contend that the first-inventor-to-
file principle would decrease the complexity, length and expense associated with current 
USPTO interference proceedings. Rather than being caught up in lengthy interference 
proceedings in an attempt to prove dates of inventive activity that occurred many years 
previously, they assert, inventors could continue to go about the process of innovation. 
Supporters also observe that U. S. industry already organizes its affairs on a first-
inventor-to-file basis in order to avoid forfeiture of patent rights abroad." 
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The effect of a shift to the first-inventor-to-file rule upon individual inventors, small 
firms, and universities has been debated. Some observers state that such entities often 
possess fewer resources and wherewithal than their larger competitors, and thus are less 
able to prepare and file patent applications quickly. Others disagree, stating that smaller 
concerns are more nimble than larger ones and thus better able to submit applications 
promptly. They also point to the availability of provisional applications,'9 asserting that 
such applications allow small entities to secure priority rights readily without a 
significant expenditure of resources. A quantitative study of interference proceedings by 
Gerald Mossinghoff, a former Commissioner of the USPTO, also suggested that the first-
to- invent rule neither advantaged or disadvantaged small entities vis-a-vis larger 
enterprises." 
 
The role of the U.S. Constitution is sometimes debated within the context of the patent 
priority principle. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution provides Congress with 
the authority: "To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries." Some observers suggest this language suggests, or possibly even mandates, 
the current first-to-invent system. Others conclude that because the first-inventor-to-file 
only awards patents to individuals who actually developed the invention themselves, 
rather than derived it from another, this priority system is permissible under the 
Constitution." 
 
In analyzing the propriety of these positions, it should be noted that under well-
established U.S. law, the first-inventor-in-fact does not always obtain entitlement to a 
patent. If, for example, a first-inventor-in-fact maintained his invention as a trade secret 
for many years before seeking patent protection, he may be judged to have "abandoned, 
suppressed or concealed" the invention." In such a case a second-inventor-in-fact may be 
awarded a patent on that invention. Courts have reasoned that this statutory rule 
encourages individuals to disclose their inventions to the public promptly, or give way to 
an inventor who in fact does so." As the first-inventor-to-file rule acts in a similar fashion 




Prior User Rights 
 
The patent reform debate has also considered the expansion of the "first inventor defense" 
established by the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999. As currently found at 35 
U.S.C. 273, an earlier inventor of a "method of doing or conducting business" that was 
later patented by another may claim a defense to patent infringement in certain 
circumstances. Though has been devoted towards broadening this defense by allowing it 
to apply with respect to any patented subject matter. 
 
The impetus for this provision lies in the rather complex relationship between the law of 
trade secrets and the patent system. Trade secrecy protects individuals from 
misappropriation of valuable information that is useful in commerce. One reason an 
inventor might maintain the invention as a trade secret rather than seek patent protection 
is that the subject matter of the invention may not be regarded as patentable. Such 
inventions as customer lists or data compilations have traditionally been regarded as 
amenable to trade secret protection but not to patenting.24 Inventors might also maintain 
trade secret protection due to ignorance of the patent system or because they believe they 
can keep their invention as a secret longer than the period of exclusivity granted through 
the patent system." 
 
The patent law does not favor trade secret holders, however. Well- established patent law 
provides that an inventor who makes a secret, commercial use of an invention for more 
than one year prior to filing a patent application at the PTO forfeits his own right to a 
patent." This policy is based principally upon the desire to maintain the integrity of the 
statutory proscribed patent term. The patent law grants patents a term of twenty years, 
commencing from the date a patent application is filed." If the trade secret holder could 
make commercial use of an invention for many years before choosing to file a patent 
application, he could disrupt this regime by delaying the expiration date of his patent. 
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On the other hand, settled patent law principles established that prior secret uses would 
not defeat the patents of later inventors." If an earlier inventor made secret commercial 
use of an invention, and another person independently invented the same technology later 
and obtained patent protection, then the trade secret holder could face liability for patent 
infringement. This policy was based upon the reasoning that once issued, published 
patent instruments fully inform the public about the invention, while trade secrets do not. 
As between a subsequent inventor who patented the invention, and thus had disclosed the 
invention to the public, and an earlier trade secret holder who had not, the law favored the 
patent holder. 
 
The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 reconciled these principles by providing 
an infringement defense for an earlier inventor of a method of doing business that was 
later patented by another. By limiting this defense to patented methods of doing business, 
Congress responded to the 1998 Federal Circuit opinion in State Street Bank and Trust 
Co. v. Signature Financial Group.29 That judicial opinion recognized that business 
methods could be subject to patenting, potentially exposing individuals who had 
maintained business methods as trade secrets to liability for patent infringement. As 
originally enacted, then, he first inventor defense was arguably a focused provision 
directed towards a specific group of potential patent infringers. 
 
As presently codified at 35 U.S.C. 273, the first inventor defense is subject to several 
additional qualifications. First, the defendant must have reduced the infringing subject 
matter to practice at least one year before the effective filing date of the application. 
Second, the defendant must have commercially used the infringing subject matter prior to 
the effective filing date of the patent. Finally, any reduction to practice or use must have 
been made in good faith, without derivation from the patentee or persons in privity with 
the patentee. 
 
Legislation proposed in the 109" Congress would have expanded upon the first inventor 
defense by allowing it to apply to all patented subject matter. The effect of this legislative 
proposal would have been to introduce "prior user rights" into U.S. law. A feature of 
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many foreign patent regimes, prior user rights are seen as assisting small entities, which 
may lack the sophistication or resources to pursue patent protection. The provision of 
prior user rights would allow such entities to commercialize their inventions when they 
used the subject matter of the invention prior to the patent's filing date, even when they 
themselves did not pursue patent rights. For this reason, a more expansive prior user 
rights regime has also been tied to adoption of the first-inventor-to-file priority system.3o 
 
Proponents of prior user rights also assert that the new legislation would support 
investment in technological innovation. Under this view, firms would not longer be 
required to engage in extensive defensive patenting, but rather would be able to devote 
these resources to further innovation. In addition, some commentators observe that many 
U.S. trading partners, including Germany and Japan, currently allow prior user rights. As 
a result, U.S. firms that obtain patent rights in certain foreign nations may face the 
possibility that a foreign firm may enjoy prior user rights in that invention. Foreign firms 
with U.S. patents do not currently face this possibility with respect to U.S. firms, 
however. Under this view, adoption of prior user rights in the United States would "level 
the playing field" for U.S. industry." 
 
Proposals to adopt prior user rights have attracted critics, however. Some observers 
believe that under such a regime individuals, aware that they could rely upon prior user 
rights, would be discouraged from disclosing their inventions through the patent system. 
Others have stated that prior user rights reduce the value of patents and therefore make 
innovation less desirable. The role ofthe U.S. Constitution is sometimes debated within 
this context as well. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution provides Congress 
with the authority: "To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries." Some commentators suggest this language suggests, or possibly requires, a 
system of exclusive patent rights, rather than patent rights that are mitigated by prior user 
rights." 
 
Post-Grant Opposition Proceedings 
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Legislation before the 109' Congress would have introduced post- grant opposition 
proceedings into U.S. patent law. Oppositions, which are common in foreign patent 
regimes, are patent revocation proceedings that is usually administered by authorities 
from the national patent office. Oppositions often involve a wide range of potential 
invalidity arguments and are conducted through adversarial hearings that resemble 
courtroom litigation. 
 
Although the U.S. patent system does not currently include oppositions, the U.S. patent 
system has incorporated a so-called reexamination proceeding since 1981. Some 
commentators have viewed the reexamination as a more limited form of an opposition. 
Under the reexamination statute, any individual, including the patentee, a competitor, and 
even the USPTO Director, may cite a prior art patent or printed publication to the 
USPTO. If the USPTO determines that this reference raises a "substantial new question 
of patentability" with respect to an issued patent, then it will essentially reopen 
prosecution of the issued patent. 
 
Traditional reexamination proceedings are conducted in an accelerated fashion on an ex 
parte basis. Following the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, an inter partes 
reexamination allows the requestor to participate more fully in the proceedings through 
the submission of argument and the filing of appeals. Either sort of reexamination may 
result in a certificate confirming the patentability of the original claims, an amended 
patent with narrower claims or a declaration of patent invalidity. 
 
Congress intended reexamination proceedings to serve as an inexpensive alternative to 
judicial determinations of patent validity." Reexamination also allows further access to 
the legal and technical expertise of the USPTO after a patent has issued 34 However, 
some commentators believe that reexamination proceedings have been employed only 
sparingly and question their effectiveness." 
 
Some observers have expressed concern that potential requesters are discouraged from 
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commencing inter partes reexamination proceedings due to a statutory provision that 
limits their future options. In order to discourage abuse of these proceedings, the inter 
partes reexamination statute provides that third-party participants may not later assert that 
a patent is invalid "on any ground that [they] raised or could have raised during the inter 
partes reexamination proceedings."" Some believe that this potential estoppel effect 
disinclines potential requesters from use of this postgrant proceeding. 
 
Many observers have called for the United States to adopt an opposition system in order 
to provide more timely, lower cost, and more efficient review of issued patents." Such a 
system could potentially improve the quality of issued patents by weeding out invalid 
claims. It might also encourage innovative firms to review issued patents soon after they 
are granted, thereby increasing the opportunity for technology spiilovers." Concerns have 
arisen over oppositions because they too may be costly, complex, and prone to abuse as a 
means for harassing patent owners." A successful opposition proceeding will require a 
balancing of these concerns. 
 
Patent Damages Reform 
 
A fundamental premise of the patent system is that the market most effectively assesses 
the worth of inventions.' Reliance upon market mechanisms allows the government to 
promote innovation with relatively modest effort and expense, particularly in comparison 
with the rewardbased systems that are the chief alternatives to patents." As Judge Giles S. 
Rich explained: 
 
[I]t is one of the legal beauties of the system that what is given by the people through 
their government-the patent right-is valued automatically by what is given by the 
patentee. His patent has value directly related to the value of his invention, as determined 
in the marketplace. 
 
Consistent with this orientation, the patent law aspires to fix damages for infringement at 




As suggested by the $1.52 billion damages award Alcatel-Lucent recently obtained 
against Microsoft, evidence is mounting that judicial determinations of damages for 
patent infringement have begun to exceed market rates. This problem appears to be due 
in part to the combination of the increasing popularity of the patent system and the 
growing sophistication of technology. In the twenty-first century, the number of issued 
patents has reached a level virtually unimaginable to an earlier generation. By an order of 
magnitude, the number of extant patents has never been higher than it is today.' 
Contemporaneously, technologies have grown more complex. Even everyday consumer 
products, ranging from cellular telephones to automobiles, commonly incorporate 
hundreds or thousands of individual components." These trends have resulted in an 
environment where high technology products increasingly embody not merely a single or 
handful of patented inventions, but hundreds or even thousands of them. 
 
Within this milieu, the prospect that high technology firms must obtain licenses from 
multiple patent holders in order to market their products has become a virtual certainty. 
Yet case law and empirical evidence alike reveal that the courts are inclined towards 
awarding damages that may far exceed an individual patent's contribution to an infringing 
product. To name ten such recent cases: 
 
In Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc.,' the claimed invention consisted of a particular type of 
"loudspeaker enclosure"-essentially a cabinet in which a stereo loudspeaker sits. In 
particular, the patented loudspeaker enclosure featured a "port tube" that allowed some of 
the acoustic energy inside the cabinet to be released with proper attention to phase 
relationships, in order to eliminate port noise and increase bass response. When assessing 
damages against an adjudicated infringer, however, the trial court allowed the royalty 
base to consist of the entire loudspeaker system, rather than just the infringing port tube. 
 
The court of appeals in Code-Alarm, Inc. v. Electromotive Technologies Corp. 47 
allowed the value of the entire vehicle alarm system to serve as the royalty base, rather 
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than the single component (a motion sensor) that was patented. 
 
In Fonar Corp. v. General Elec. Co. , the patented invention was limited to a specific 
imaging feature incorporated into an Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) machine. The 
court nonetheless upheld a jury's damages award consisting of a royalty based upon the 
value of an entire accused MRI machine. 
 
The infringed patent in Hem, Inc. v. Behringer Saws, Inc." claimed a "feed table," a 
mechanical device for moving workpieces, such as sections of wood, towards a saw, drill, 
or other machine tool. The jury awarded infringement damages based not just upon sales 
of feed tables, however, but upon the adjudicated infringer's sales of unpatented saws as 
well. 
 
In Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc.," the court of appeals affirmed the 
inclusion of all of the patent proprietor's products in the royalty base, rather than merely 
the infringing image viewing system. 
 
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Newbridge Networks, Inc." involved the infringement of a 
patented data networking device. With respect to damages, the court allowed two 
unpatented software programs- designated as 4602 and 46020-to be included in the 
royalty base, even though they were not physically part of the patented device, and were 
not even necessary for the patented device to operate. 
 
The Federal Circuit overturned the damages award in Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Leztron, 
Inc., 12 relating to a microingredient weighing machine that included the patented 
invention. Overturning the district court , the court of appeals authorized a royalty award 
based on sales of the unpatented microingredients because it was reasonably foreseeable 
that the patentee would have profited from sales of the microingredients had the 
infringement not occurred. 
 
The patentee in State Contracting & Engineering Corp. v. Condotte" was awarded 
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reasonable royalties based upon the amount of an entire construction contract, rather than 
merely upon the cost of the patented soundwall. 
 
In Symbol Technologies v. Proxim," the court awarded damages based upon a 6% royalty 
based upon the infringement of two patents relating to the IEEE 802.11 wireless local 
area networking standard (commonly known as WiFi). Because hundreds of issued 
patents and pending applications cover the 802.11 cluster of standards, the royalty 
obligations of any firm selling WiFi products could be many multiples of the product's 
sales price. 
 
In Tee Air, Inc. v. Denso Manufacturing Michigan Inc.," a suit involved a patented 
method and device for balancing a fan inside an assembly, the court of appeals upheld a 
damages award based upon sales of entire radiator and condenser assemblies. 
 
Damages awards that dramatically exceed the commercial value of a patented invention 
conflict with the fundamental patent law norm that the marketplace is the best evaluator 
of an invention's worth. This theoretical imbalance manifests itself through a number of 
deleterious practical consequences. First, excessive damages awards may promote patent 
litigation. A rational patent proprietor may be unwilling to make fair royalty demands in 
the boardroom when they are able to obtain significantly higher damages awards in the 
courtroom. 
 
Second, the gap between the damages awarded for patent infringement and the 
marketplace value of a patented invention may also encourage speculation in patents. So-
called trollsentrepreneurial speculators who prefer to acquire and enforce patents rather 
than engage in research, development, manufacturing, or other socially productive 
activity-may be animated in part by the reality that patent damages awards may exceed 
profits that can be obtained in the marketplace." Put differently, overly generous damages 
awards may encourage firms to play the patent game, rather than engage in 
manufacturing, marketing, or other more socially productive activity. 
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Third, the failure to apportion patent damages may cause the scope of patent protection 
routinely to extend beyond the scope of its claims. At times, of course, the scope of the 
claim does not adequately reflect the marketplace value of the inventor's contribution, 
due either to claim drafting or commercial marketing decisions. In such circumstances 
courts appropriately apply the Entire Market Value Rule. Yet when the Entire Market 
Value Rule effectively becomes the default damages principle, rather than one that 
applies under only particular circumstances, the actual scope of patent protection may 
greatly exceed the claim scope that has been sought and obtained. Failure to apportion 
damages may cause a patent effectively to cover contributions that lie within the public 
domain, as well as technology that has been patented by third parties or even by the 
infringer. Current patents remedies practice too quickly disregards a host of patentability 
and infringement doctrines- including, among others, novelty, nonobviousness, 
enablement, claim construction, and the doctrine of equivalents-that attempt to achieve a 
just balance between promoting innovation and preserving competitions' 
 
These three factors contribute to an additional point of concern: The imposition of 
unreasonable royalty burdens upon high technology manufacturers." Modern products 
and processes commonly embody numerous patented inventions, with some 
incorporating on the order of one thousand or more. Overly generous damages awards 
with respect to just a fraction of these patents may impose infringement liability upon 
manufacturers that dramatically exceeds the profits the infringer made. Such an outcome 
fails to recognize that the patent system serves not just to promote innovation, but also to 
encourage the dissemination of new products and processes to the marketplace." 
 
The decline of apportionment principles may also be due to an affirmative judicial desire 
to award a prevailing patent proprietor supracompetitive rates as damages. Under this 
rationale, although courts state that damages award are intended only to compensate 
patent proprietors for the infringement, they are nonetheless sympathetic to patent 
proprietors who prevail in litigation but leave the courtroom with market-oriented rates. 
For example, in the influential decision in Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works, 
Inc.," Chief Judge Markey explained that: 
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Except for the limited risk that the patent owner, over years of litigation, might meet the 
heavy burden of proving the four elements required for recovery of lost profits, the 
infringer would have nothing to lose, and everything to gain if he could count on paying 
only the normal, routine royalty non-infringers might have paid. As said by this court in 
another context, the infringer would be in a "heads-I-win, tails-you loose positio. 
 
Under this view, failure to augment damages insufficiently compensates patent 
proprietors who are forced to litigate. It may also encourage infringers to refuse to license 
voluntarily. 
 
The reasoning in Panduit suffers from several flaws. First, Congress has also stipulated 
that prevailing patent proprietors may be entitled to the award of a permanent injunction 
prohibiting future infringement.' Unless the adjudicated infringer can readily shift its 
manufacturing and distribution facilities to an alternative technology, the imposition of an 
injunction is likely to be a costly and even fatal event for that enterprise. The availability 
of an injunction provides an additional incentive for private bargaining, regardless of the 
award of damages for past infringement. 
 
Second, this line of reasoning ignores the reality that the patent system relies upon 
stubborn defendants in patent cases to weed out invalid patents.' The punishment of 
adjudicated infringers through high damages awards would not only discourage private 
efforts to maintain patent quality, it is also inconsistent with congressional directives 
expressed within the Patent Act. Notably, Congress has provided for the award of 
enhanced damages," as well as the award of attorney fees in "exceptional cases. Congress 
is of course free to expand upon the circumstances in which courts may award punitive 
damages. Notably, earlier patent statutes called for the automatic award of punitive 
damages," and one bill introduced in the 109' Congress called for the award of attorney 
fees to prevailing patent holders." Absent statutory amendments, however, judicial award 
of punitive damages or attorney fees through the guise of compensatory damages flies in 
the face of congressional intent. 
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Because overly generous damages awards may ultimately impede the process of 
technological innovation and dissemination that the patent system is meant to promote, 
current legislative reform proposals directed towards infringement remedies appear 
appropriately focused. In recognition of the concerns of high technology manufacturers, 
the 109" Congress featured two bills that in part concerned the apportionment of patent 
damages. In the House of Representatives, the proposed Patent Reform Act of 200569 
would have accounted for apportionment as follows: 
 
In determining a reasonable royalty in the case of a combination, the court shall consider, 
if relevant and among other factors, the portion of the realizable profit that should be 
credited to the inventive contribution as distinguished from other features of the 
combination, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or 
improvements added by the infringer." 
 
An alternative Patent Reform Act of 2006 was later introduced before the Senate." The 
proposed Senate bill would have addressed apportionment as follows: 
 
In determining a reasonable royalty consideration shall be given to 
 
(A) the economic value that should be attributed to the novel and nonobvious feature or 
features of the invention, as distinguished from the economic value attributable to other 
features, improvements added by the infringer, and the business risks the infringer 
undertook in commercialization; 
 
(B) the terms of non-exclusive marketplace licensing of the invention; and 
 
(C) other relevant factors in applicable law." 
 
The substance of both of these formulations derive from factor 13 of the Georgia-Pacific 
analysis. Although the differences between the two bills are subtle, they are significant. 
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The House bill would have required consideration of apportionment "if relevant "-a 
statutory reform that may have simply confirmed existing law." By requiring that 
apportionment "shall" be considered in reasonable royalty cases, the Senate bill would 
have presented a more robust reform proposal. 
 
In addition, the Senate bill appears to have addressed concerns over the precise wording 
of the House bill." With its use of the seemingly innocuous terms "combination" and 
"inventive contribution," the House bill awakened memories of older case law from a 
period that was entirely less favorable to patents. Some decades past, the term 
"combination patent" was not only a pejorative, it also invoked more stringent validity 
criteria-- ones that seemed inevitably to result in an invalid patent." The distinct wording 
of the Senate bill undoubtedly eased some concerns among the patent bar about the 
unintended invocation ofunwelcome patenting standards from an earlier era. 
 
The notion that patent damages should be based upon the value of the inventor's 
contribution stands among the more venerable damages doctrines in all ofpatent 
jurisprudence. In an era where apportionment concerns are more cogent than ever, courts 
have treated this doctrine with surprising neglect. The resulting trend towards overly 
generous damages awards may allow patentees to obtain proprietary interests in products 
they have not invented, encourage litigation, promote patent speculation, place 
unreasonable royalty burdens upon producers of high technology products, and ultimately 
impede the process of technological innovation and dissemination that the patent system 
is meant to foster. By better aligning the patent system's aspirations with its practical 
workings, reinvigoration of apportionment principles may stand among the more 
significant contributions by current patent reformers. 
